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COMMENTS
"Reasonable Care" in Section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933
The overall policy of the federal securities laws1 is to control
abuses in the issuance and sale of securities by requiring disclosure
of material information 2 to purchasers. Until recently, private
rights of action were freely implied under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 19343 and rule 10b-5,4 promulgated by the
' This comment is concerned primarily with the Securities Act of 1933; 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77mm (1976) [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as 1933 Act], and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, id. §§ 78a-78kk [hereinafter cited without cross-reference as 1934
Act].
. The definition of "material" accepted by the courts for the 1934 Act, see Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972), is substantially the same as that
promulgated by the SEC under the 1933 Act in rule 405(l), 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1980):
The term "material", when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of informa-
tion as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters as to which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the secur-
ity registered.
3 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange-
(b) to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security regis-
tered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
1934 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
4 It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
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Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") pursuant to its
rulemaking power. Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are phrased
merely as prohibitions against fraudulent or misleading practices
in the context of sales of securities, but the duty to refrain from
such practices had been interpreted by the SEC and the courts as
one running to purchasers,5 and therefore purchasers harmed by
the willful or negligent 6 violation of that duty could recover
damages.
In 1976, however, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,7 the Su-
preme Court restricted the liberal implication of 10b-5 actions by
reading into the statute a scienter requirement for private damage
suits. The effect of the Court's decision is to remit plaintiffs who
cannot show scienter to their explicit remedies for negligent mis-
disclosure under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933.8
These sections thus have acquired a new importance, and ambigui-
ties in their language and articulation present problems of inter-
pretation. Indeed, the difficulties are illustrated by the Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co. litigation, which began as a 10b-5 suit in 1970
and finally has been resolved as a section 12(2) suit eleven years
later.9
Unlike rule 10b-5, which is a blanket prohibition against the
dissemination of misinformation by "any person. . . in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security,"'10 sections 11 and 12 of
the 1933 Act impose specific duties on specific categories of per-
sons." They also attempt to define the scope of the duties by out-
lining a degree of care that, if met, will be an affirmative defense to
liability. What the sections leave unclear is whether the degrees of
care demanded of the various classes of persons are the same. Ac-
cordingly, this comment first examines the legislative history and
structure of these provisions of the 1933 Act, the case law explicat-
ing them, and certain external considerations relevant to their in-
terpretation. Concluding that the standards of care in sections 11
I Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
150-54 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
s Negligence was held to be a sufficient premise for liability in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
7 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1976).
9 See note 146 infra. See also text and notes at notes 144-153 infra.
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980); see note 4 supra.
1 See text and notes at notes 21-27 infra.
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and 12(2) were meant to differ, the comment then focuses on 12(2),
the most problematic section. It examines how the buyer-seller re-
lationship gives specific content to the duty of care demanded by
section 12(2), looking first to analogous duties for general guidance,
then to particular elements of the relationship that may affect the
standard, and finally to the nature of the security involved.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM
Although a basic policy of both the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is disclosure, the areas each
act regulates and the methods by which disclosure is demanded
differ. The 1933 Act addresses the issuance of securities and their
initial sale, and its basic mechanism is the registration of the se-
curities themselves.12 The 1934 Act concentrates on the sales pro-
cess rather than on the securities. It provides for the registration of
brokers, securities exchanges, and securities dealers' associations,
and for the filing of information concerning listed issuers and their
securities.13 It also sets certain industry standards directly; for ex-
2 1933 Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). Certain classes of securities are exempted from
registration in id. § 3(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a) (1976), including: securities guaranteed by a
governmental body or issued by a bank; commercial paper arising out of or used for current
transactions and having a maturity of no more than nine months; securities issued by non-
profit organizations; securities issued by savings and loan and similar institutions; securities
issued by firms regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission; securities issued by re-
ceivers or trustees in bankruptcy; insurance or endowment policies and annuity contracts
regulated by another governmental body; securities exchanged by the issuer for those held
by its existing security holders; securities issued in exchange for other property interests
after the fairness of the exchange has been determined at a hearing by a federal court or
agency; and securities offered and sold only to residents of the same state or territory in
which the issuer is incorporated or does business. Registration also is not required for secur-
ities the SEC exempts by its rules and regulations, as long as the amount of the issue pub-
licly offered does not exceed $500,000, id. § 3(b), and securities issued by small investment
companies, if the SEC chooses to exempt them, id. § 3(c).
Certain transactions are exempted from the registration requirement by id. § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 77d (1976): transactions by those other than securities market professionals; trans-
actions by issuers that do not involve a public offering; transactions by dealers that are not
close to or part of the initial offering; transactions by brokers to fill unsolicited customers'
orders; and transactions involving the sale of promissory notes secured by real estate, as
long as the notes are originated by government-regulated institutions and the sale meets
certain other requirements.
" See 1934 Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976) (registration of securities sold on securities
exchanges); id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1976) (periodic reports by issuers to keep information
on themselves and their securities current); id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976) (registration of
brokers and dealers); id. § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1976) (registration of securities exchanges); id.
§ 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976) (registration of dealers' associations); id. § 16, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p (1976) (registration of directors, officers, and principal stockholders of issuers).
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ample, it mandates margin requirements for brokers.14 Both acts
prohibit the parties they govern from making material misstate-
ments or misleading omissions related to the sale of securities. The
1934 Act does so in section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, under which pri-
vate rights of action by purchasers have been implied. The lan-
guage of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act15 contains a similar ban, but
implication of private rights of action under that section has been
restrained by the presence of explicit remedial provisions in sec-
tions 11 and 12 of the same act and by the availability of 10b-5
actions.18 The recurrence of these "antifraud" provisions empha-
sizes that the acts share a common goal, despite the differences in
their vantage points.
A more detailed consideration of the 1933 Act further illus-
trates how the two statutory schemes converge. The basic require-
ment of the 1933 Act is that certain parties closely involved in the
issuance of the securities (the issuer and its officers) prepare a reg-
istration statement. 7 The registration statement contains informa-
tion about the issuer, such as its name, type and place of business,
directors, principal owners, and financial condition; about the se-
14 See id. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1976) (margin requirements); id. § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 78h
(1976) (restrictions on borrowing).
15 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976):
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use
of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate com-
merce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
Section 17(a) was the model for rule 10b-5. See Conference on Codification of the Federal
Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 793, 922 (1967).
19 There are some differences between an action implied from section 17(a) and one
implied from rule 10b-5, and these differences have been urged alternately as reasons to
prohibit and reasons to allow section 17(a) actions. Compare Horton, Section 17(a) of the
1933 Securities Act-The Wrong Place for a Private Right, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 44 (1973)
with Note, Implied Civil Remedies Under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 53
B.U.L. REv. 70 (1973). This debate is irrelevant to the point here, however: such actions
have not been an important phenomenon, and now that rule 10b-5 actions have been lim-
ited so as not to compete with sections 11 and 12(2), it is unlikely that courts will allow
section 17(a) actions to blossom and fill that void, a course recommended by Note, Section
17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act: An Alternative to the Recently Restricted Rule 10b-5, 9
RuT.-CAM. L.J. 340 (1978).
17 1933 Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1976).
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curities proposed to be issued, such as their purpose and amount,
anticipated proceeds from their sale, and offering price; about the
underwriter of the proposed issue, such as its name, its sales com-
mission, and a copy of the underwriting agreement; and other de-
tails.18 The statement is filed with the SEC, which reviews it and
may demand revisions, although the Commission does not guaran-
tee the statement's accuracy to the public.19 The registration state-
ment itself is thereafter publicly available on request. In addition,
every seller must furnish the purchaser with a prospectus contain-
ing the registration statement's most basic information.2 0
Two sections define the liability of parties governed by the Act
for failure to comply with its disclosure requirements. Section 1121
covers those responsible for producing the registration statement.
It makes the signatories of the statement, present and incipient
directors of the issuer, auditors or other experts who have prepared
parts of the statement or reports on which the statement is based,
and underwriters, liable to purchasers of the security if the regis-
tration statement "contained an untrue statement of a material
fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mislead-
ing." 2 Each of these parties may avoid liability, however, if he can
prove he used sufficient care to comply with the disclosure require-
18 Id. § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1976); Schedules A & B, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (1976). The regis-
tration statement forms prescribed by the SEC, 1 DONNELLEY SEC HANDBOOK 3-2-3 to -10-1
(1980), give specific guidance for meeting the statute's demands. The precise requirements
vary with the type of security.
I" Congress recognized that SEC verification of this information would be impractic-
able, and opted instead for a mechanism that required disclosure and expanded liability for
misdisclosure to encourage private enforcement. Congressional hearings indicate that the
intent of the statute was merely to give purchasers the same informational advantages as
issuers, and to allow them to invest in speculative securities with open eyes. Congress did
not mean to make either the government, which was to manage the informational network,
or the issuer guarantors of the securities. See Federal Securities Act: Hearings on H.R. 4314
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58,
141 (1933) [hereinafter cited as 1933 House Hearings]. The brief letter from President
Roosevelt to Congress calling for the legislation was careful to caution against a scheme of
government approval of securities. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress (Mar. 29,
1933) [hereinafter cited as Roosevelt Letter], reprinted in 1933 House Hearings, supra, at 1.
That caution continues in the present law: the prospectus furnished to purchasers of securi-
ties must state prominently in large type that the SEC has neither verified the information
it contains nor approved the securities. Rule 425, 17 C.F.R. § 230.425 (1980).
20 1933 Act § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1976); id. § 10, 15 U.S.C. §,77j (1976). The
prospectus is simply part 1 of the registration statement. See Form S-1, pt. 1, 1 DONNELLEY
SEC HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 3-2-3 to -20.
21 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
22 Id. § 77k(a).
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ments.2 s The section specifies in detail what constitutes sufficient
care: he must have had, "after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe" that there was no misstatement or omission.24
He may rely on statements of experts and "official persons" as long
as "he had no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe"
that they were false or incomplete. 5 The standard of reasonable-
ness is "that required of a prudent man in the management of his
own property. '26
Section 12,1" which applies to sellers of securities, both rein-
forces section 11 and creates independent liabilities. Section 12(1)
imposes strict liability on those who sell securities that should have
been registered but were not. Insofar as sellers are deterred by
12(1), it also operates to cut off the means of distribution for issu-
ers who flout section l1's registration requirements. Section 12(2)'s
relationship to section 11 is more complex. Like section 11, it im-
poses liability for misdisclosure, here on sellers whose prospectuses
or other written or oral statements in connection with a sale are
misleading. Like section 11, it provides an affirmative defense; but
it describes the defense merely as "reasonable care," and unlike
section 11, it does not further define the phrase. In its application
to prospectuses, which are part of the registration statement, sec-
tion 12(2) encourages sellers to police issuers and insiders-a form
of secondary enforcement of section 11. In its application to the
seller's own representations, section 12(2) is a primary enforcement
mechanism on sellers themselves. Furthermore, in both its primary
and secondary aspects, section 12(2) reaches all sellers, a category
that comprehends both underwriters (also covered by section 11)
and brokers and dealers (covered by section 12 alone).
Thus a purchaser complaining of fraudulent or deceptive prac-
tices in the context of a sale of securities could, at least before the
2 The issuer itself is strictly liable for such misstatements or omissions. Id. § 77k(b).
24 Id. § 77k(b)(3)(A)-(B).
25 Id. § 77k(b)(3)(C)-(D).
21 Id. § 77k(c). As originally enacted, this section provided that the standard of care
was "that required of a person occupying a fiduciary relationship." Securities Act of 1933,
ch. 38, § 11(c), 48 Stat. 83. Congress modified this strong language to its present form in
1934, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 206(c), 48 Stat. 907, in response to anxiety
in the investment community, but intended to effect no change in its force. H.R. REP. No.
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 8669 (1934) (memorandum of Sen.
Fletcher). The new language merely substituted the standard definition of a trustee's duty
of care as contained in the contemporary RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 169 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1931), for the term "fiduciary."
.7 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
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limiting of 10b-5 actions, state his claim under the sales-oriented
1934 Act. Or he could sue under section 11 or section 12 of the
1933 Act, depending on the status of the misleading party.2e Sec-
tion 12(2) is the most obviously Janus-like: it premises liability
both on misdisclosure in the prospectus, a document at the heart
of the 1933 Act's scheme, and on misdisclosure in other sales rep-
resentations, activities on which the 1934 Act is more sharply fo-
cused. The principal distinctions between these apparently inter-
changeable remedies are that the time and remedy limitations
under the 1933 Act are more stringent.29 In Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, however, the Supreme Court thought that the reme-
dial provisions of the two acts should be treated as organic rather
than competitive.30 It therefore decided to remit purchasers of se-
curities who were harmed by negligent misrepresentations to the
more specific remedies of sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act.1
By diverting large numbers of purchaser suits into the 1933
Act's ambit, the Court has focused attention on the affirmative de-
28 Although the 1933 Act is not primarily concerned with regulating sales, the behavior
it prohibits can become civilly actionable only in the sales context.
2 Remedies under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act could be more liberal primarily be-
cause this statute, which does not explicitly authorize private actions for damages at all, also
does not restrict what damages are recoverable. Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act-limit
their explicit remedies to rescission if the purchaser still owns the security at the time of
suit, or the amount the purchaser paid less the amount gained on resale (the counterpart of
rescission as a making-whole remedy) if he has disposed of it, plus awards of attorney's fees.
Sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act also have strict statutes of limitations. See 1933 Act
§ 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976). Actions under section 11 (by purchasers against those closely
associated with the issuance of the security, for false or misleading information in the regis-
tration statement required by the 1933 Act) must be brought within one year of the time
when the misinformation should, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered, but no
more than three years after the security was publicly offered. Actions under section 12(1)
(by purchasers against sellers for selling unregistered securities that should have been regis-
tered) must be brought within one year of the sale, but no more than three years after the
public offering. Actions under section 12(2) (by purchasers against sellers for false or mis-
leading oral or written sales information) must be brought within one year of reasonable
discovery of the misinformation, but no more than three years after the sale. By contrast,
there is controversy over what statute of limitations should apply to rule 10b-5 actions. See,
e.g., Bateman & Keith, Statutes of Limitations Applicable to Private Actions Under SEC
Rule 10b-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39 Mo. L. REv. 165 (1974); Martin, Statutes of
Limitation in 10b-5 Actions: Which State Statute is Applicable?, 29 Bus. LAw. 443 (1974).
30 425 U.S. at 206-11.
1 Cf. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1309 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc):
To argue that a section of the 1934 Act, which neither by its terms nor its history
manifests a similar attention to the careful balance struck in Section 11,. . . impose[s]
upon directors the same duties as Section 11 and more, is to thwart, not serve, the
purpose of Congress and the dictates of sound policy . ...
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fenses in sections 11 and 12. As noted earlier, 2 section 12(1) af-
fords no defenses. Section l1's "reasonable investigation" require-
ment is extensively glossed. Section 12(2)'s "reasonable care"
requirement is relatively unexplicated. Thus the relationship be-
tween "reasonable investigation" and "reasonable care," and the
specific content of the diligence requirement of section 12(2), re-
quire definition.
II. SECTIONS 11 AND 12(2): THE RELATIVE STANDARD OF CARE
A. Legislative History
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 in an atmosphere
of indignation and anxiety over the losses suffered in the market
collapse; the goal was to restore confidence in investment and to
reverse the psychology of depression."3 Its perception of the prob-
lem illuminates the structure of section 11 of the Act. A leitmotif
in the hearings on the originally proposed bill, and in the bill itself,
is the conviction that issuers and their agents must assume greater
accountability to purchasers of the securities they distribute. The
responsibility of directors was a particular object of concern be-
cause of the indiscriminate use of armies of "dummy" direc-
tors-eminent men who served as figureheads for advertising pur-
poses and collected fees for their endorsements 4 but did not
See text and note at note 27 supra.
See 1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 207 (remarks of Rep. Sabath):
We must act. We must have legislation, not only to protect the people in the future,
but to bring about the punishment of the men who brought about ruin to 20,000,000
American people, who are responsible for thousands upon thousands of suicides; who
brought about a condition that has destroyed the value of the property of the men,
women, and children of America; a condition that has brought about destruction of the
property of widows and orphans; and that has closed the banks, ruined business men
and manufacturers in every section of the Nation.
... We must reestablish confidence .... Not until confidence is reestablished can
we expect that conditions of this country will improve again.
This comment does not seek to add to the extensive literature challenging the effectiveness
of the scheme adopted in the 1933 Act in attaining these goals. Rather, it seeks only to
explicate the statute as it was enacted.
[I]n London financial circles they call those directors who go around attending meet-
ings "guinea pigs", because every man gets a guinea for every meeting he attends. In
New York they have not named them, but there are many men in New York on many
boards of directors whose sole business is to attend meeting after meeting of directors,
for which they receive $10 or $20. They hold themselves out to the public, or their
names are held out to the public, in order to sell the public.
1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 125 (remarks of Rep. Marland).
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actually direct.3 5 The solution proposed by the original bill and de-
bated in the congressional hearings was to impose on all directors a
very high degree of responsibility: strict liability to purchasers in
cases of misrepresentation, no matter how innocent.36
The proposal was expected to have two desirable effects. First,
it would excise idle supernumeraries from many boards, leaving
only those who were committed and competent to continue as di-
rectors.37 Second, it would provide relief to purchasers harmed by
misrepresentations. Holding directors strictly liable, even if they
could not have prevented the harm and were not morally culpable,
was justified on the following basis: in choosing which of two
nonculpable parties should bear the costs of a mistake, it was
fairer to make the director pay, because he had made the mistake
and he stood to profit from directing the company and selling its
securities.3 8 The force and frequency with which this argument was
advanced demonstrate the willingness of some legislators to impose
a greater burden than the common law fraud rules would have
imposed.
Several considerations suggested lightening the burden some-
what, however. First, even the most diligent director could not ver-
ify every fact required in the registration statement; he had to rely
at least in part on information compiled by others.3 9 The English
31 I know that there are men sitting on boards of directors of banks and other corpora-
tions who never attend meetings, and their names are used, and they permit their
names to be used in fact, for publicity purposes. That sort of thing is reprehensible,
and there should be some way of reaching them.
Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Couzens) [hereinafter cited as 1933 Senate
Hearings]. See also 1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 122 (remarks of Rep. Parker);
id. at 123 (remarks of Rep. Merritt); id. at 125 (remarks of Rep. Marland); 1933 Senate
Hearings, supra, at 271 (statement of Ollie M. Butler).
" See H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9, reprinted in 1933 House Hearings, supra
note 19, at 6; S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9, reprinted in 1933 Senate Hearings, supra note
35, at 6.
11 1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 215 (statement of Houston Thompson). See
also id. at 216 ("I would be surprised if you could find any man so dumb in the face of this
law, who would become a dummy director, with the penalties of this act staring him in the
face"); 1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 208 (statement of Alexander Holtzoff); id.
at 271 (statement of Ollie M. Butler).
11 1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 271 (statement of Ollie M. Butler). This
notion was reiterated throughout the hearings, often in nearly identical language. See 1933
House Hearings, supra note 19, at 122 (statement of Ollie M. Butler); id. at 124-25 (state-
ment of Houston Thompson; remarks of Rep. Mapes); id. at 244-45 (statement of Robert E.
Healy); 1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 204-05, 206, 207 (statement of Alexander
Holtzoff); id. at 249 (statement of Ollie M. Butler).
I" The argument that directors must rely on experts recurs throughout the hearings.
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Companies Act, one of the models examined by the framers of the
1933 Act, provided that directors could rely on information certi-
fied by auditors and thereby avoid otherwise strict liability.40 It
prompted the suggestion that the same procedure be adopted in
the American law.41 Had the British system of government regula-
tion of auditors also been adopted in the United States, this propo-
sal would have been more appealing; but allowing reliance on ex-
perts without such an independent restraint on the experts
themselves was repeatedly rejected in the congressional hearings.42
Second, there was apprehension that strict liability would in-
hibit even beneficial activity, contrary to President Roosevelt's call
for "legislation . .. to protect the public with the least possible
interference to honest business. '43 Legitimate and conscientious
directors might be impeded by sanctions originally designed to
get rid of directorial deadwood." There was even a fear expressed
See, e.g., 1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 248 (remarks of Sen. Couzens): "[T]he
serious director. . . wants to be guided, and obviously has to be guided, by somebody that
knows more about these things than he does." See also id. at 206-10 (remarks of Sen. Couz-
ens); id. at 208 (remarks of Sen. Adams).
40 Companies Act, 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 37 (reenacted in Companies Act, 1948;
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 43).
"' Discussion of this suggestion occurs throughout the hearings. See 1933 House Hear-
ings, supra note 19, at 121 (statement of Ollie M. Butler, remarks of Rep. Parker); id. at 124
(statement of Ollie M. Butler); id. at 168-71 (statement of William C. Breed); id. at 191
(suggested amendments presented by William C. Breed); id. at 216 (statement of Houston
Thompson, remarks of Reps. Rayburn, Parker, and Kenney); 1933 Senate Hearings, supra
note 35, at 204-10 (remarks of Sens. Gore, Couzens, and Adams); id. at 247-48 (statement of
Ollie M. Butler, remarks of Sen. Couzens).
42 See, e.g., 1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 216 (statement of Houston
Thompson):
[T]he British accountant is in a totally different situation from the accountant in
America. He not only belongs to an organization, but he is a chartered accountant, and
responsible to the Government. He is responsible for fraud. He is responsible for gross
carelessness. He is responsible in many ways, so that the accountant is just as anxious
to have the truth known as the director would be to have the truth known and that is
the reason why the British act deals with him as it does.
Under American law, if the director could shift responsibility to the unregulated accountant,
"you would not have anybody who would be financially responsible for a misstatement."
1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 208 (statement of Alexander Holtzoff). If liability
remained on the director, then the purchaser would not suffer for the director's mistakes,
and the director would have an incentive to choose competent auditors. See 1933 House
Hearings, supra note 19, at 122 (statement of Ollie M. Butler). See also id. at 123, 124; 1933
Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 206-10 (statement of Houston Thompson); id. at 248,
270-71 (statements of Ollie M. Butler).
3 Roosevelt Letter, supra note 19.
"1 One witness at the Senate hearings asked:
Where is there a director of any corporation just about to issue securities that would
dare to sit on a board in this country if this act, as now drawn, goes through? He
1981]
The University of Chicago Law Review
that holding directors strictly liable would amount to an uncon-
stitutional prohibition-rather than a regulation-of interstate
commerce.
45
Thus there were two particular areas of tension in the debates
about the precursor of section 11. One was an issue of scope: could
directors rely on experts or were they required to take responsibil-
ity for all statements, however indirect their own knowledge might
be? The other issue involved the standard of care: apart from the
protection vel non of reliance on experts, was strict liability an un-
desirably high standard?
The bills subsequently reported out of the Senate and House
committees reflect these tensions. The Senate proposal" retained
strict liability in all cases, and did not allow reliance on experts.47
cannot rely upon anything; he must know it all, in a small company or a large company.
He must sign the statement with a detailed list of assets and liabilities and properties,
accounts receivable and accounts payable. Could you or I sit on a board of directors
and take personal and individual liability if there is a mistake in any one of those
figures... ?
1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 126 (statement of William C. Breed). See also id.
at 92-93 (letter of H.C. Hopson); id. at 205, 207 (remarks of Sen. Gore); id. at 209-10 (re-
marks of Sen. Couzens).
"1 1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 39 (statement of Houston Thompson, re-
marks of Rep. Lea); 1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 126-27, 175-77 (statements of
William C. Breed).
S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1933).
4' The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency explained its reasons for these
choices:
The question is whether ignorance of an untruth should excuse the director and
leave the loss upon the buyer. To do so in our opinion would fail to give the buyer the
needed relief and fail to restore confidence. If one of two presumably innocent persons
must bear a loss, it is familiar legal principle that he should bear it who has the oppor-
tunity to learn the truth and has allowed untruths to be published and relied
upon ....
Accordingly the registration of false information under the bill makes not only the
issuer, but the directors who sign, civilly liable for return of the money which the pur-
chaser paid for the security. If a director can excuse himself by saying that he has in
good faith relied upon an accountant's statement, or the statement of some other per-
son, then the investor will continue in the same position from which the Nation is
struggling to extricate him. ...
This phase of the law will have a direct tendency to preclude persons from acting
as nominal directors while shirking their duty to know and guide the affairs of the
corporation ....
The committee believes that making directors and officers personally liable will
result in persons retiring from many boards and confining their efforts to a few boards
where they will actually direct.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
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The House bill,48 however, reduced the general standard of care
demanded and broadened the class of people subject to the stan-
dard. Although the issuer itself remained strictly liable for mis-
statements and omissions, for all others with inside responsibility
the bill replaced strict liability with a fiduciary's standard of care
and allowed reasonable reliance on experts. However, as a trade-off
for allowing reliance, the bill subjected experts themselves to lia-
bility for misrepresentations in their statements, if they failed to
meet the same standard of care. 4' Despite these moderations, the
House committee thought the bill would be effective in achieving
the same preventive and remedial objectives sought by the Senate,
because the burdens it imposed remained very high. 0
The common ground between the Senate, with its strict liabil-
ity language, and the House, with its somewhat lower but more
comprehensive standard of care, seems to be an intent to impose a
burden as close to strict liability as was thinkable. 51 In light of the
48 H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
"' See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933), accompanying the bill
as finally enacted, which followed the House bill's framework:
Delegation to others of the performance of acts which it is unreasonable to require that
the fiduciary shall personally perform is permissible. Especially is this true where the
character of the acts involves professional skill or facilities not possessed by the fiduci-
ary himself. In such cases reliance by the fiduciary, if his reliance is reasonable in the
light of all the circumstances, is a full discharge of his responsibilities. In choosing
between these two standards of liability, the Senate accepted the standards imposed by
the House bill.
Though the standards of the Senate amendment were more severe than those em-
bodied in the House bill, the classes of persons upon whom liability was imposed were
less. The House bill imposed liability upon the underwriters and also upon the experts,
such as accountants, appraisers, and engineers, who gave the authority of their names
to statements made in the registration statement.
See also J. WIESEN, THE SECURITIES AcTs AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS: WHAT DID CONGRESS
INTEND? 34-36 (1978).
60 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933):
Honesty, care, and competence are the demands of trusteeship. These demands are
made by the bill on the directors of the issues [sic], its experts, and the underwriters
who sponsor the issue. If it be said that the imposition of such responsibilities upon
these persons will be to alter corporate organization and corporate practice in this
country, such a result is only what your committee expects .... But to require [direc-
tors] to guarantee the absolute accuracy of every statement that they are called upon
to make, would be to gain nothing in the way of an effective remedy and to fall afoul of
the President's injunction that the protection of the public should be achieved with the
least possible interference to honest business.
51 See id. at 10: "To impose a lesser responsibility would nullify the purposes of this
legislation. To impose a greater responsibility, apart from constitutional doubts, would un-
necessarily restrain the conscientious administration of honest business with no compensat-
ing advantage to the public."
There has been some academic debate about the statute's actual effect on common law
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clear indications in the legislative history that it only reluctantly
reduced that standard from strict liability to liability for slight
negligence, Congress might have executed its demand for abundant
care by calling in the statute for "reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances." The compromise provision finally enacted as section
11, however, is much more specific. It defines an exacting standard
of reasonableness, 2 makes investigation a prerequisite for avoiding
liability," and subjects experts themselves to potential liability.5 4
It is noteworthy that the early debate focused entirely on di-
rectors and experts. The bills as originally introduced did not cover
underwriters as a category,5" and vendors of securities were liable
only for deliberate misrepresentations. In revising the bill the
House committee broadened its coverage to make underwriters lia-
ble for negligent misrepresentation, 5 but the Senate committee re-
tained the original bill's scheme. The conference committee
duties. Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case (pt. 1),
55 VA. L. REV. 1, 42-45 (1969), argues that the'duty of a director was already a fiduciary
duty at common law. He doubts that the draftsmen of the 1933 Act intended to establish a
still higher standard, the standard to which the trustee of an express trust is held. Instead
he explains the strong language of the debates and the enacted legislation as an expression
of outrage that the common law standard had not been properly enforced. One of the wit-
nesses at the congressional hearings had also expressed a belief that the proposed legislation
was merely declaratory of existing law; but his belief must have been mistaken, because the
provision to which he referred was the strict liability proposal that evolved into section 11.
1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 125 (statement of Ollie M. Butler).
Against Folk's interpretation, there is Congress's own statement that "[t]he responsibil-
ity imposed is no more nor less than that of a trust." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
9 (1933). A contemporary commentator also thought that Congress was departing from the
common law by raising the standard of care to a fiduciary standard. Shulman, Civil Liabili-
ties and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 248 (1933).
Whatever the strict truth is about a director's duties at common law, it seems indisput-
able that Congress thought it was defining duties stricter than those to which directors had
hitherto been subject. This perception is important in determining the relative weight of the
burdens Congress intended to impose on nondirectors.
52 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (1976).
11 Id. § 77k(b). Someone is required to investigate every portion of the official represen-
tations, either the expert, on whose "expertised" portions the nonexperts may rely, or the
nonexpert, who must verify the non-"expertised" portions.
54 Id.
" "Underwriter" is defined in 1933 Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976), as
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for an
issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a di-
rect or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has a partici-
pation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term
shall not include a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an under-
writer or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers'
commission.
" H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
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adopted the House version." Apparently, Congress thought under-
writers were closely enough involved in and responsible for the is-
suance and promotion of securities to warrant classifying them as
insiders and subjecting them to the same standard of care expected
of directors.5 8
More interestingly, it was not until the compromise between
the Senate and House versions that the class of sellers qua sellers
(a class that includes, but is larger than, underwriters) was given
independent responsibility for negligent misrepresentation under
section 12(2). The motivations for enacting section 12(2) of the
1933 Act are as murky59 as the motives for enacting section 11 are
clear. The bill originally proposed made vendors liable for knowing
falsity,60 a provision that altered the common law of fraud only in
relieving purchasers of the need to show reliance on the vendors'
statements."1 It also made the liability of signatories of the regis-
8 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933), quoted in note 49 supra.
The centrality of the underwriter's role in the issuance and promotion of new securi-
ties is often cited as a justification for this burden. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 370 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973):
No greater reliance in our self-regulatory system is placed on any single participant in
the issuance of securities than upon the underwriter. He is most heavily relied upon to
verify published materials because of his expertise in appraising the securities issue
and issuer, and because of his incentive to do so. He is familiar with the process of
investigating the business conditions of a company and possesses extensive resources
for doing so. Since he often has a financial stake in the issue, he has a special motive
thoroughly to investigate the issuer's strengths and weaknesses. Prospective investors
look to the underwriter-a fact well known to all concerned and especially to the un-
derwriter-to pass on the soundness of the security and the correctness of the registra-
tion statement and prospectus.
5, The President's message to Congress recommending the enactment of securities leg-
islation boasted that "[t]his proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further
doctrine 'let the seller also beware.'" Roosevelt Letter, supra note 19. It is clear from the
context of this and other references to sellers in the congressional hearings that the term
was being used loosely, as the opposite of "buyer," to refer to the main objects of concern:
the issuer and directors who originated the securities. In the act as adopted, however, the
term "seller" has acquired a more technical meaning; otherwise section 12 would make no
sense in juxtaposition to section 11. Although the Act defines "sale" and "sell" in section
2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1976), it does not define "seller."
" H.R. 4314, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1933), reprinted in 1933 House Hearings, supra
note 19, at 6; S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9 (1933), reprinted in 1933 Senate Hearings,
supra note 35, at 6:
In case any such statement shall be false in any material respect, any persons acquiring
any securities to which such statement relates, either from the original issuer or from
any other person, shall have the right to rescind the transaction and to obtain the
return, either at law or in equity, of any and all consideration given or paid for any
such securities upon the surrender thereof, either from any vendor knowing of such
falsity or from the persons signing such statement, jointly or severally ....
"1 The elements of the common law action of deceit are: a false representation by the
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tration statement-that is, directors-run with the security, so
that every purchaser of the security, no matter who his vendor was,
could claim his remedy from the source.62 Far from wanting to put
increased burdens on sellers, the framers of the original bill were
reluctant even to require sellers (other than underwriters) to de-
liver a copy of the prospectus as a routine part of each sale. s
Section 12(2) as enacted, however, makes it a defense that the
seller "did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could
not have known, of [the actionable] untruth or omission. '64 Here,
as in section 11, the initial provision was altered significantly in
the legislative process. However, the direction of the compromise
in section 12(2) was toward increasing the scope of the liability-to
cover negligent as well as knowing misrepresentations. In section
11, the movement had been in the opposite direction-from strict
liability to a liability that admitted of some defenses. There is no
reason to assume that the two migrations met at a midpoint and
created a single standard of liability for section 11 and section
12(2) defendants. There is thus no basis for construing "reasonable
care" in section 12(2) as picking up all the investigative duties im-
posed by section 11.
Congress seems rather to have operated on an understanding
that the various links in the chain of distribution have characteris-
tic responsibilities 5 and that sections 11 and 12(2), taken together,
cover that chain and apply to each link a set of appropriate
requirements:
All who sell securities with such a flaw [material misrepresen-
tation or omission], who cannot prove that they did not
know-or who in the exercise of due care could not have
known-of such misstatement or omission, are liable under
sections 11 and 12. For those whose moral responsibility to
the public is particularly heavy, there is a correspondingly
heavier legal liability-the persons signing the registration
statement, the underwriters, the directors of the issuer, the
defendant, scienter, intent to influence the plaintiff's action, justifable reliance by the plain-
tiff, and damage. W. PROssER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
62 See note 60 supra.
1933 House Hearings, supra note 19, at 36-37 (statement of Houston Thompson).
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1976).
41 "The duty of care to discover varies in its demands upon participants in security
distribution with the importance of their place in the scheme of distribution and with the
degree of protection that the public has a right to expect." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1933).
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accountants, engineers, appraisers, and other professionals
preparing and giving authority to the prospectus-all these
are liable to the buyer not only if they cannot prove they did
not know of the flaw in the information offered the public but
also if they cannot prove they could not have found that flaw
"after reasonable investigation" and that they "had reason-
able ground to believe and did believe * * * that such state-
ment was true or that there was no such omission."
' e
The difficulty is that the statutory scheme is reminiscent both
of wheels within wheels and of categories along a spectrum. The
wheel-within-a-wheel metaphor is suggested by the congressional
language just quoted: section 12(2), despite its shrouded origins,
seems to be the general provision, and section 11 the particulariz-
ing one. Given its theory of a chain of distribution, with duties
corresponding to each link, Congress could have drafted a single
provision that called for "reasonable care under all of the circum-
stances." Instead it saw a need to specify and created two provi-
sions: section 12(2), requiring reasonable care in the ordinary
sense, and section 11, requiring a more explicitly defined version of
reasonable care, in which the reasonableness expected is that of a
fiduciary and the care always requires an investigation. At the
same time, the legislative history of the enactment of sections 11
and 12(2) suggests that directors, experts, and underwriters were
thought to be at one end of a spectrum, and vendors at the other.
The most likely explanation of this confusion of metaphors is that
the section 11 standard of care is both presumptively higher, be-
cause section 11 preselects the cases in which the general standard
would be most demanding, and more particularized, as a result of
the special status of section 11 defendants.
B. Subsequent Analysis and Commentary
Although the specific content of the burdens imposed by sec-
tion 11 has been examined by courts and commentators in some
detail,67 the precise issue of its relationship to the burdens of sec-
" Id.
67 Section 11 had been little used, and directors, experts, and underwriters had fallen
into the habit of discharging their statutory duties through perfunctory "due diligence
meetings," until the force of the statute was rediscovered in Escott v. BarChris Constr.
Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). In that case, which was electrifying not because it
was innovative but because it applied the statutory requirements literally, the defendants
included the entire spectrum of parties governed by section 11: current and incoming direc-
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tion 12(2) has been discussed very little. Most of the commentary
on the problem has concluded that the "reasonable investigation"
requirement of section 11 is more stringent than the "reasonable
care" requirement of section 12(2). For example, a contemporary
analysis of the 1933 Act observed that "as to material untruths or
omissions under Section 12(2) the standard applied is merely that
of 'reasonable care' 68 and that "[t]he burden is placed on the
dealer. . . to prove 'that he did not know, and in the exercise of
reasonable care could not have known, of such untruth or omis-
sion.' The standard of reasonableness is not here defined as in Sec-
tion 11(c) and presumably is somewhat less exacting." 9 Some
more recent analyses reach the same conclusion. The American
Law Institute, for example, in formulating a model securities code,
recognized the lack of clarity about the relative weight of the vari-
ous duties of care imposed by the current law on various parties,
but analyzed the law as containing three gradations in strictness:
strict liability, which is illustrated by section 12(1); a standard of
care that demands "reasonable investigation," which is illustrated
by section l1's requirement that insiders be responsible for the
non-"expertised" portions of their registration statements; and a,
basic negligence standard, which is illustrated by the reliance on
experts allowed under section 11, and by section 12(2).10
Two articles have disagreed. In the first, Professor Folk has
argued that section 12(2) imposes a duty to investigate that is ap-
proximately equal to the insiders' duty to verify non-"expertised"
portions of the registration statement.71 This position is directly
contrary to the ALI understanding just described. Folk bases his
tors, underwriters, and auditors. The plaintiffs, purchasers of the debentures of a bowling
alley construction company that went bankrupt and defaulted on its interest payments,
brought suit alleging misrepresentations in the company's registration statement. The court
discussed the relationships among the burdens expected of various parties, and among the
various defendants' roles in the distribution process and their burdens of care. Id. at 682-
703. This case spawned abundant commentary. See, e.g., Folk, supra note 51.
Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 208 (1933).
' Id. at 208 n.205.
o ALI FEDERAL SECURTrES CoDE § 287(5) (Proposed Official Draft 1978); accord, John
Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 49 U.S.L.W. 3706, 3706 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari) (" 'Investigation' commands a greater undertaking than
'care' "). See also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1308-09 n.105 (2d Cir. 1973) (en
banc); Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Current Issues and Developments in
the Duties and Liabilities of Underwriters and Securities Dealers, 33 Bus. LAw. 335, 391-
93 (1977); Comment, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 226, 229 n.34 (1969).
71 Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris Case (pt. 2),
55 VA. L. REv. 199, 207-14 (1969).
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argument implicitly on the following syllogism: the "reasonable in-
vestigation" requirement in section 11 merely restates the common
law;7 2 the "reasonable care" requirement in section 12(2) also re-
flects common law standards;73 therefore the two phrases have es-
sentially the same connotations.7 Furthermore, he argues that the
same standard of reasonableness should be applied in both sec-
tions on the principle that a term used in adjacent portions of a
statute should have the same meaning in both.75 These arguments
are unconvincing for several reasons. First, even if both sections
state common law duties, the duty to investigate may be required
only in the particular range of the common law spectrum of care
associated with the situations delineated by section 11, so that sec-
tion 12(2) would not require investigation in every case. 76 Second,
the two sections apply to different kinds of people; the director
and the broker may occupy different positions in the spectrum of
common law duty. Finally, the principle of statutory construction
that like terms ought to be defined alike within a statute is mis-
placed in this instance, because section 11 goes out of its way to
define a special term, and the special meaning should not be gener-
alized without specific guidance. Folk's general thesis that the 1933
Act's civil liability provisions speak with one voice and should be
construed alike77 fails to explain why there are separate provisions
at all and overlooks their very different origins as shown in the
legislative history. The observation that sections 11 and 12(2) were
enacted at the same time and for the same general purpose does
not prove that their different language means the same thing;78 it
"' But see note 51 supra.
73 DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1968), holds that in the absence of a
statutory definition the term "reasonable care" in section 12(2) should be construed by com-
mon law standards.
74 Folk, supra note 71, at 211-12. Folk then qualifies this assertion somewhat: "Assum-
ing arguendo that the reasonable care concept may sometimes entail an investigation, it
would normally suffice for the [section 12(2)] defendant only to ask such questions and
make such inquiries as are feasible under the circumstances." Id. at 213. If this is so, it is
not helpful to equate the section 12(2) duties with those of section 11, even with the duties
of one of the less responsible section 11 parties, because section 11 always requires investi-
gation, whether by the insiders themselves or by the experts on whom they rely.
75 Id. at 212.
76 See text and notes at notes 64-66 supra.
77 Folk, supra note 71, at 212.
78 See id. at 211. But see John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 49 U.S.L.W. 3706, 3706 (U.S.
Mar. 23, 1981) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari): "In providing standards of
care under the 1933 Act, Congress thus used different language for different situations. ...
The difference in language is significant, because in the securities acts Congress has used its
words with precision."
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tends to prove the opposite.
In the second article, Professor Kaminsky goes beyond equat-
ing the two standards of care and suggests that section 12(2)'s de-
mands may be even greater than section l1's.19 He focuses on the
specific language of the affirmative defense in section 12(2): that
the seller is liable unless he sustains "the burden of proof that he
did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission." 80 By placing emphasis on the
phrase "could have known," Kaminsky concludes that every seller
is charged with constructive knowledge of every knowable fact, and
that the seller therefore has none of the good-faith defenses ex-
pressly provided in section 11 to directors and others.81 This argu-
ment reads too much into the use of the word "could,"8 " and reads
out the reasonableness requirement altogether. The legislative his-
tory plainly demonstrates that section 11 defined primary respon-
sibilities;s8 thus any interpretation that would make mere sellers
more responsible than directors is untenable.8 4
A separate objection to Folk's equation of "reasonable care"
and "reasonable investigation," or to Kaminsky's argument that
"reasonable care" is a more exacting standard, is that the conse-
quences of putting those assumptions into practice would subvert
the statutory scheme. As a first approximation it would make no
difference how the burdens were distributed as long as they were
clearly defined, because the affected parties would simply redis-
tribute them by demanding higher compensation to cover the costs
of compliance. If the increased costs are high enough, however,
some transactions will become uneconomic and cease. Congress
79 Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How It
Compares with Rule lob-5, 13 Hous. L. REv. 231 (1976).
80 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976).
81 Kaminsky, supra note 79, at 275-77.
8 The same expression is used in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1933), to
describe the duties of both section 11 and section 12(2), disproving that it has the meaning
Kaminsky claims. As the ALI draftsmen noted in another context, "[ilt is perfectly obvious
that many if not most of today's nuances are not only unnecessary but also harmful." ALI
FEDERAL SECurrEs CODE § 287(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
' See Part 11-A supra.
For example, the broker who is paid a small commission could discover errors by
independently verifying certified audit reports, on which the director is entitled to rely, but
it would violate the scheme of gradations of responsibility to require him to do so. The
statutory definition of underwriters, 1933 Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976), reflects
this common-sense distinction: "such term shall not include a person whose interest is lim-
ited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary
distributors' or sellers' commission."
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made it clear that the burdens it meant to impose were not to be
so high as to "impair honest business" or to operate as a prohibi-
tion rather than a regulation."' To construe the distribution of
statutory duties in a way that would ignore that limitation would
undermine one of the statute's main purposes.8 6
But even if demanding a very high degree of care from section
12(2) parties as a matter of course would not shut down business,
it certainly would offend good sense in another important way.
Separate and independent verification of the registration state-
ment or prospectus, especially by those with the least expertise or
access to the facts, would be wasteful. Redundant investigations
would do the investor a net disservice by increasing the cost of
securities but adding no increment of protection. Congress recog-
nized that such duplication may be undesirable when it allowed
nonexperts to rely on expert data, rather than making both the
experts and nonexperts liable under section 11 for misstatements
in the "expertised" parts of the registration statement. Although
section 11 does demand duplicative verification of the non-"exper-
tised" parts by issuers, directors, and underwriters, 87 the demand
85 See text and notes at notes 43-45 supra. See also John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 49
U.S.L.W. 3706, 3707 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (if
section 12(2) parties must perform section 11 investigations, "the efficiency of the short-
term financial markets will be impaired" (footnote omitted)).
" To the extent that the statutory scheme places high costs on a particular party
rather than a whole category of transactions, it would theoretically be possible to reallocate
costs voluntarily. Thus parties with overlapping duties might be expected to delegate the
responsibility for compliance to the one for whom compliance is cheapest. The delegator
would remain liable to purchasers in case of misrepresentation, but he could seek indemnity
from the delegee who failed to comply. This model would produce maximum avoidance of
harm at the lowest social cost. See Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 517, 526-28 (1980).
However, indemnification agreements-at least among parties subject to section
11-have been held to be against public policy: "Underwriters who knew they could be in-
demnified simply by showing that the issuer was 'more liable' than they (a process not too
difficult when the issuer is inevitably closer to the facts) would have a tendency to be lax in
their independent investigations." Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). See also Comment, supra note 70. The
court in Globus may have been unsympathetic to the underwriter's indemnity claim in part
because the underwriter knew about the misrepresentation, and therefore was not a cheaper
cost avoider than the issuer. The court's assertion that independent investigation is a good
thing in itself is probably true only in cases such as those in which revelation of the misrep-
resentation ruins the issuer and leaves the plaintiff with no solvent defendant save the inde-
pendent verifier. If such collapses were common in the crisis preceding the enactment of the
1933 Act, one could argue that Congress intended indemnification to be unavailable.
87 See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
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seems to have been motivated by a moral judgment that those who
create the registration statement should be accountable for it,"s es-
pecially when they stand to profit by the sales it induces.89 This
justification does not fit the seller, however, who need not fall into
that category. If Congress meant the seller to have some duty to
investigate, even a more modest one than that expected of more
central figures in the issuance of the securities, one would expect it
to have said so explicitly, especially in light of its explanation that
the investigative burden may vary among parties covered by sec-
tion 11 depending on their role in the distribution. The separate
provision for sellers suggests that their duty qua sellers is different
in kind rather than degree. 1
III. THE FACTORS THAT DEFINE THE STANDARD OF CARE UNDER
SECTION 12(2)
The discussion so far has used the legislative history, the argu-
ments of legal commentators, and some common-sense economics
to support the proposition that the section 12(2) duty of care is
neither identical to nor higher than section 11 duties. Section 12(2)
cannot be explicated by a process of exclusion, however. The na-
ture of the buyer-seller relationship and the particular features of
the security sold help to give the 12(2) standard a distinctive yet
flexible set of connotations and limits.
A. The Buyer-Seller Relationship
Under the 1934 Act, the SEC has a mandate to register as-
sociations of brokers and dealers9 2 whose rules
" For duties related to the distributional hierarchy, see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Seas. 9 (1933), quoted in note 65 supra.
'9 For the relevance of profit, see 1933 Senate Hearings, supra note 35, at 271 (state-
ment of Ollie M. Butler): "[O]f one of two persons who must suffer for a mistake, it is more
equitable that the one who had made the mistake should suffer than the innocent pur-
chaser, particularly when the one who has made the mistake is making a profit in directing
the company and selling the securities." Although the statement was made about the Senate
proposal to hold directors strictly liable, the idea of correlating liabilities and rewards was
not so limited, see note 38 supra.
"0 See note 65 supra.
91 Note that the seller cannot always avoid a duty to investigate, but such a duty is not
imposed solely by section 12(2). For instance, an underwriter who markets a registered of-
fering has duties to verify the registration statement under section 11, to verify the prospec-
tus as part of the registration statement under section 11, and not to make misleading rep-
resentations in the prospectus under section 12(2).
92 1934 Act § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1976).
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are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and
practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade, to
foster cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with re-
spect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to remove
impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free and open
market and a national market system, and, .in general, to
protect investors and the public interest.9 3
One such organization, the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers ("NASD"), has been registered, and has adopted Rules of Fair
Practice.9 4 One of the NASD rules has generated the "suitability"
doctrine; out of the NASD rules, general notions of warranty, and
its own administrative practice, the SEC has created the "shingle"
theory. The question is whether either of these describes a buyer-
seller paradigm that should be incorporated, explicitly or implic-
itly, into the "reasonable care" requirement of section 12(2).
1. The Suitability Doctrine. Purchasers frequently have al-
leged violations of NASD or similar self-regulatory rules as the ba-
sis for damages in suits brought under the general jurisdiction sec-
tion of the 1934 Act,95 usually in conjunction with claims impliedly
arising under specific prohibitory provisions such as section
10(b).96 A particularly fertile source of such suits has been the
NASD rule that requires members to have reason to believe that
the securities they recommend are suitable for their customers'
needs.97 Such suits have been entertained by the courts with vary-
ing degrees of receptivity,98 and they have engendered considerable
" Id. § 78o-3(b)(6).
NASD MANuAL (CCH) It 2001-2401 (1976).
" 1934 Act § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976).
" See, e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1977); Utah State Univ. of Agricultural & Applied Science v. Bear,
Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 167-69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1977); SEC v.
First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); Buttrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141-43 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
'7 NASD RULES OF FAIR PRACTcE art. III, § 2, NASD MANuAL (CCH) 2152 (1976).
The New York Stock Exchange "know your customer" rule, NYSE RULE 405, 2 NYSE
GumE (CCH) 2405 (1972), has invited similar attention.
"' The courts have dealt with two kinds of questions. One is under which of the rules, if
any, actions may be implied. See, e.g., Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141-43 (7th Cir.) (actions implied under rules designed to protect public),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182
(2d Cir.) (actions implied under rules whose place in the regulatory scheme justifies implica-
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academic commentary.9
The terms on which the suitability doctrine can avail pur-
chaser plaintiffs have been changed, however. The rationale of
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder's requirement of scienter in section
10(b) actions 00 applies with greater force to actions not only im-
plied but based on rules several removes from a statute, and would
screen out many NASD-based 10b-5 complaints.10 1 More impor-
tant, Touche-Ross & Co. v. Redington0 2 counsels against the auto-
matic implication of private rights of action simply because a stat-
ute is designed to protect securities purchasers. The force of these
Supreme Court cases is to give new importance to section 12(2),
which requires only negligence and specifically authorizes private
suits. The new question, therefore, is whether the rules of self-reg-
ulatory organizations such as the NASD give specific and enforce-
able content to the statutory "reasonable care" requirement.103
The difficulty the courts have perceived in giving such effect
to NASD rules is that some of them are designed to serve purposes
other than defining duties to purchasers.104 This has led courts to
tion), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966). The other question concerns what degree of fault
makes violations actionable. Most cases have allowed the action only in cases of fraud. See,
e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 160 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1086 (1977); Utah State Univ. of Agricultural & Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549
F.2d 164, 167-69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1977). Buttrey, however, left open
the question of whether negligence was sufficient.
E.g., Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the Over-the-Counter Securities Markets:
Implied Liabilities Based on NASD Rules, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 633 (1966); MacLean, Brokers'
Liability for Violation of Exchange and NASD Rules, 47 DENVER L.J. 63 (1970); Rediker,
Civil Liability of Broker-Dealers under SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. REv.
15 (1969); Note, Implied Civil Liability Arising From Violation of the Rules of the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rlv. 151 (1975); Comment, Civil
Liability for Violation of NASD Rules, 121 U. PA. L. Rv. 388 (1972).
100 425 U.S. at 206-11.
101 Ernst & Ernst therefore confirms the trend of allowing implication of actions under
self-regulatory rules only in cases of fraud. See note 98 supra.
102 442 U.S. 560 (1979). In Touche-Ross the Court refused to imply a private damages
action from the filing requirements of section 17(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)
(1976), the applicable SEC rules, and the rules of the New York Stock Exchange:
Certainly, the mere fact that § 17(a) was designed to provide protection for brokers'
customers does not require the implication of a private damages action on their be-
half.... The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this
Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into
law.
442 U.S. at 578 (Rehnquist, J.).
103 In Touche-Ross terms, the hypothetical question is whether the Court would have
used the New York Stock Exchange rules to define a breach of the statutory filing require-
ments if it had found that section 17(a) created a private right of action for damages.
1" It was for this reason that the court in Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358
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engage in line drawing in order to segregate the rules under which
implication is proper from those under which it is not.105
The more serious problem, however, is that treating even the
selected rules as enforceable obligations under the statute accords
them a force they should not have.10 6 It is more proper to treat the
rules as no more than general indications of the duties the statute
prescribes. This approach preserves the primacy of the statute and
prevents the rules from being construed like statutes themselves.
There are two dangers in construing self-regulatory rules like stat-
utes: they may restrict the statute's general demand for reasonable
care to their own specific compass, or they may liberate the statute
from its prescribed bounds by importing terminology with a cloud
of implications that Congress never intended. Moreover, there is a
policy problem. Focusing on the rules that benefit purchasers, as
the "suitability" doctrine seeks to do, might have the unfortunate
effect of inhibiting the adoption of such rules.10 7 NASD and similar
rules therefore should not provide an automatic roster of the de-
mands of due care under section 12(2), although they may help
provide a notion of what due care involves.
2. The Shingle Theory. Another source of general care pre-
scriptions, similar to the suitability doctrine, is the "shingle" the-
ory developed by the SEC in administrative proceedings. This the-
F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966), said that "the court must look to
the nature of the particular rule and its place in the regulatory scheme, with the party
urging the implication of a federal liability carrying a considerably heavier burden of per-
suasion than when the violation is of a statute or an SEC regulation."
208 See note 98 supra.
104 The general problem is discussed in Fonda v. St. Paul City Ry., 71 Minn. 438, 449,
74 N.W. 166, 169 (1898):
Private rules of a master regulating the conduct of his servants in the management
of his own business, although designed for the protection of others, stand on an entirely
different footing from statutes and municipal ordinances designed for the protection of
the public. The latter, as far as they go, fix the standard of duty towards those whom
they were intended to protect, and a violation of them is negligence in law or per se.
But a person cannot, by the adoption of private rules, fix the standard of his duty to
others. That is fixed by law, either statutory or common. Such rules may require more,
or they may require less, than the law requires; and whether a certain course of con-
duct is negligent, or the exercise of reasonable care, must be determined by the
standard fixed by law, without regard to any private rules of the party.
10 See id. at 450, 74 N.W. at 170:
A person may, out of abundant caution, adopt rules requiring of his employees a much
higher degree of care than the law imposes. This is a practice that ought to be en-
couraged, and not discouraged. But, if the adoption of such a course is to be used
against him as an admission, he would naturally find it to his interest not to adopt any
rules at all.
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ory holds that when a broker-dealer hangs out his shingle, he
impliedly makes certain representations to the public, such as that
he is in compliance with the NASD rules,108 or that he has a rea-
sonable basis for his representations, which in turn implies that he
has conducted a reasonable investigation of the securities he sells
and their issuer. 10 9
The shingle theory originally was used only in disciplinary ac-
tions in which the SEC sought to revoke sellers' registrations under
the 1934 Act or their membership in the NASD. The SEC estab-
lished in those cases that when brokers and dealers fail to conduct
reasonable investigations they have acted willfully and are there-
fore subject to revocation or other sanctions.110 Recently, however,
the theory has been invoked by purchasers who allege implied mis-
representations as the basis of private damage suits. 1 Importing
the lore of administrative proceedings into the statutory scheme of
damage actions is mistaken. "Reasonable investigation" may not
mean the same thing in a disciplinary proceeding as it does in sec-
tion 11.112 Still less should the shingle theory's construction of the
term be used to gloss the "reasonable care" requirement of section
12(2). Furthermore, if every negligent violation of the NASD rules,
no matter what the character of the rule, can be construed as an
implied misrepresentation, and every misrepresentation trans-
formed into a "willful" violation of the duty a seller owes his cus-
108 See N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND
SECURITIES MARKETS 2-49 to -50 (1977).
109 E.g., Richmond Corp., 41 S.E.C. 398, 406 (1963) ("By associating himself with a
proposed offering, an underwriter impliedly represents that he has made such an investiga-
tion in accordance with professional standards"); Best See., Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931, 934 (1960):
Registrant's activity in the present case involved misrepresentations to customers
in violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Acts. These provisions con-
template, at the least, that recommendations of a security made to proposed purchas-
ers shall have a reasonable basis and that they shall be accompanied by disclosure of
known or easily ascertainable facts bearing upon the justification for the repre-
sentations.
See generally N. WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, supra note 108, at 2-13 to -17.
110 E.g., Quinn & Co. v. SEC, 452 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972); R. A. Holman & Co. v. SEC, 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 991
(1967); M.V. Gray Invs., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 567 (1971); Sanford H. Bickart, 43 S.E.C. 753 (1968);
Leonard Lazaroff, 43 S.E.C. 43 (1966).
111 See, e.g., Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1170-73 (2d Cir. 1970);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702, 707 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd,
417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). See generally Hibbard, Private
Suits Against Broker-Dealers: A Proposal to Limit the Availability of Rescissory Relief for
Misrepresentations Implied by the Shingle Theory, 13 HARv. J. LEGIS. 1 (1975).
1 See text and note at note 139 infra.
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tomer not to misrepresent, the statutory scheme of graduated lia-
bility can be completely undone. All the objections to using the
NASD rules as a checklist of sellers' duties to customers apply
equally here,11 but the shingle theory, by creating a presumption
of willfulness and an aura of fraud, goes even further.
Another objection to premising liability for damages on im-
plied misrepresentations is that one may impliedly misrepresent by
saying nothing at all.114 In the 1933 Act, however, Congress chose
to impose liability for omission only when the omission causes
statements that are made to become misleading,11 5 and in the Con-
ference Report it made clear that the words mean what they say:
The Senate amendment imposed liability upon persons
making false and deceptive statements in connection with the
distribution or sale of a security. The House bill made the lia-
bility depend upon the making of untrue statements or omis-
sions to state material facts. This phrase has been clarified in
the substitute to make the omission relate to the statements
made in order that these statements shall not be misleading,
rather than making mere omission (unless the act expressly
requires such a fact to be stated) a ground for liability where
no circumstances exist to make the omission itself
misleading."""
Like the suitability doctrine, the shingle theory does have one
limited use in determining the content of a general duty of care
owed by sellers to buyers. It emphasizes the professional seller's
public aspect. If he holds himself out as a member in good stand-
ing of the NASD, he creates an expectation with the public that he
complies with NASD rules. Beyond this point, however, the shingle
theory adds nothing to the role conceded to the NASD rules under
the suitability doctrine-namely, that they can be a rough indica-
1' The danger of construing the shingle theory rather than the statute presents itself
here as well as in the suitability doctrine context, see text and notes at notes 106-107 supra.
That it is easy to do is indicated by the reference to a "breach of the shingle theory" in N.
WOLFSON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, supra note 108, at 2-50.
11 Two section 12(2) cases have involved implied misrepresentations. They do not dis-
pose of the question of whether actions based on the shingle theory are proper, however,
because in both cases the misrepresentations were implied from the defendants' actual
statements that the securities were of good quality. Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs &
Co., 560 F.2d 916, 922-23 (8th Cir. 1977); Franklin Sav. Bank v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 527 (2d
Cir. 1977).
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 771(2) (1976).
116 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
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tor of some of the duties inherent in the buyer-seller relationship.
I
B. Variations in the Standard
It may be that within an admittedly hazy general framework,
specific elements of a particular relationship between buyers and
sellers cause the duties to come more sharply ihto focus. Four of
these elements can be identified with some certainty.
1. Bargaining for Less Care. The legislative history shows
that Congress was motivated to enact the 1933 Act largely by con-
cern for investor protection. But those protections are not costless,
and the investor who does not need them may wish to bargain out
of them to avoid superfluous expenditure. The structure of the Act
indicates that private bargains with section 12(2) sellers about the
level of care required may be more permissible than such bargains
with section 11 parties, whose duties are defined more specifi-
cally.117 In fact, it seems proper to construe section 12(2)'s "reason-
able care" in the light of private agreements, because the general-
ity of the standard allows contemplation of all circumstances. This
is an example of the superiority of the general reasonableness stan-
dard over the specific demands of the NASD rules.
One district court case, subsequently affirmed on appeal, has
recognized that the seller and purchaser may bargain for less care.
In Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 11 8 the purchaser was an exper-
ienced investor in highly speculative securities who had recruited
the defendant broker to handle a particular purchase the broker
would not otherwise have handled. Although the broker failed to
disclose certain information that might have affected the pur-
chaser's decision to buy, the court held that the purchaser had
come into the deal with open eyes and had received the care he
had bargained for.
It would be unusual to see litigation involving such an agree-
ment if it were specific and detailed. Parties who draft their way
out of section 12(2)'s requirements probably cover enough contin-
gencies to avoid lawsuits. Canizaro must be the more common
case, in which a court is willing to infer a private agreement from
the totality of the circumstances. Still sketchier would be the case
in which only the sophistication of the buyer or the low level of
compensation to. the seller indicated a possibly deliberate altera-
II See text and notes at notes 65-66, 85-91 supra.
'Is 370 F. Supp. 282, 289 (E.D. La. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975).
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tion of the buyer-seller relationship. Whether either alone would
suffice is problematic.
2. Compensation. The responsibilities of various parties
under the 1933 Act are proportional to their roles in the scheme of
distribution. ' 9 Compensation is one measure of the gradations in
their roles. For instance, the underwriter, who has a more substan-
tial relationship with the issuer than the broker does,12 0 is distin-
guished from the broker in terms of compensation by the statute
itself.1 2' The SEC also recognizes that care and compensation are
interdependent.12 2 Although no case explicitly turns on the issue of
compensation, the issue should be one of the court's considerations
in determining the reasonableness of a seller's care.
3. Sophistication. The sophistication of the purchaser is a
factor that has been discussed and generally discarded by the
courts. Defendants frequently urge that because the purpose of the
1933 Act was to protect, their burdens should be reduced when
protection is unnecessary. Courts usually reply that sophisticated
purchasers are just as entitled as unsophisticated ones to the pro-
tection of the laws, and that even a sophisticated buyer cannot
make an informed judgment without complete disclosure.12 3 This
response misses an important point, however: the sophistication
that makes a difference in the level of care that is reasonable is not
general worldliness, but specific knowledge (or perhaps ready ac-
cess to it) concerning the specific security involved in the sale. As
Canizaro demonstrates, such knowledge can be a proper
consideration.
"' See text and notes at notes 65-66, 88-91 supra. See also note 84 supra.
120 See University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 898-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
121 1933 Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1I) (1976), quoted in note 55 supra.
"I In recommending the adoption of a less rigorous registration procedure for certain
kinds of securities, the SEC commented that
it is impractical to expect brokers whose compensation is limited to the minimum stock
exchange commission to engage in a thorough and complete investigation of the issuer's
affairs. A less rigorous "standard of reasonableness" for the purposes of Section 11(c)
of the Act could be prescribed by rule without sacrificing appropriate investor
protections.
SEC, Summary of Disclosure Policy Study Report, [1963-1972 Transfer Binder] Fs. SEC.
L. REP. SPECIAL STUDIES (CCH) 74,603. See also Committee on Federal Regulation of Se-
curities, supra note 70, at 393.
I's Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 690-91, 696 (5th
Cir. 1971); Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393, 1398-99
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1217 (D. Md. 1968),
rev'd on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970).
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4. Boiler Room Cases. The other side of the sophistication
coin is that, if the purchaser is at a real informational disadvan-
tage, the seller's duty may increase. One class of cases that illus-
trates this principle involves "boiler room" selling operations, in
which the securities typically are unseasoned and speculative is-
sues, sold by aggressive telephone solicitation. In disciplinary cases
involving boiler rooms, the SEC has demanded a heavy burden of
investigation even by the rather lowly salesmen, because the na-
ture of the operation makes information supplied by the sales-
men's employers inherently suspect.124 This increased duty has not
been asserted in private suits, and probably should not simply be
translated there in the formulation used in disciplinary proceed-
ings, for the reasons outlined above.12 5 One's impression, however,
is that the purchasers in such cases are precisely the gullible inves-
tors about whom Congress was concerned. In many cases the boiler
room tactics may be egregious enough by themselves to constitute
fraud and be actionable under rule 10b-5, but even in less extreme
cases, the status of the purchaser might make those tactics unrea-
sonably careless for section 12(2) sellers.
C. The Nature of the Security Itself
The boiler room cases have another facet: besides attracting
unsophisticated buyers, they typically involve particularly risky in-
vestments. They suggest, therefore, that the nature of the security
may also have a bearing on the definition of the standard of rea-
sonable care under section 12(2).
1. Warning Signals. In the few cases that have been decided
under section 12(2), most of the courts have based their decisions
on the availability of correct information about the particular se-
curity and the likelihood that the seller would be alerted to look
for it. As a rule, the cases have involved such obvious lapses126 or
1'4 Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963). There the court stated:
[T]he "public interest" requires that a salesman working out of a "boiler-room" be
held to a higher duty to prospective customers than a salesman working out of a legiti-
mate sales operation, and. . . a "boiler-room" salesman does not meet his obligation
when he has no knowledge other than opinions and brochures furnished by the broker,
"without any checking, investigation, or determination of the correctness of the same
before putting them out to the public."
Id. at 142 (quoting SEC v. Macon, 28 F. Supp. 127, 129 (D. Colo. 1939)). See also Hamilton
Waters & Co., 42 S.E.C. 784, 789 (1965).
1 See text and notes at notes 108-113 supra.
16 See, e.g., Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977)
(representation that notes of Penn Central were creditworthy despite knowledge of large
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such obvious diligence127 that the results are not difficult to reach.
Another way of looking at the cases, though it is not a technique
the courts have articulated, is to concentrate on the nature of the
security involved. For example, in Murphy v. Cady12 the security
offered was stock in the South American Utilities Corporation, a
"nice little operating company, '129 not listed on any exchange or in
Moody's. No financial statement, report of earnings, or indeed any
statement by the company accompanied the sale. The stock was
supposed to have speculative possiblities because of the dearth of
South American regulatory legislation and the favorable exchange
rates, and an additional attraction was that the Chase Manhattan
Bank was reported to have refused offers of $8.00 a share and to be
holding out for $12.00. In fact the plaintiff, a small broker, bought
at $4.50, sold to his customers, repurchased when the price contin-
ued to fall, and ultimately recovered his losses from his seller
under section 12(2).13o
In Gould v. Tricon,13 1 the plaintiff bought almost 13,000
shares of a hitherto privately held company that was about to con-
struct a plant to build and market a boat steering device. The com-
pany and several of its directors, though not subject to section l1's
registration requirements, were held liable under section 12(2) for
having made misrepresentations in the prospectus. They had said
that the device was fully designed and that development was com-
plete, but neglected to say that the device was likely to be the sub-
ject of litigation because its inventor had previously assigned all
rights in it to another employer. The suggestion, not explicit in the
case, is that stock in a new, untried venture may require more
careful and complete scrutiny by the seller.
It seems clear, however, that stock in a company that has been
first quarter losses); Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939) (unchecked optimistic
representations about speculative securities, when checking would have been simple), affd,
113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 705 (1940).
1'7 See, e.g., DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968) (due care exercised when
defendant had no reason to suspect that the underwriter would fail to deliver securities to
purchasers); Gould v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (defendant director not
liable for failure to check accuracy of codirector's biographical statement).
129 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me. 1939), afl'd, 113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
705 (1940).
129 Id. at 467.
11o The court dismissed the plaintiff's common law action for deceit, because he had not
done any investigating, either. It treated section 12(2) as reversing the burden of proof: the
seller would be liable under section 12(2) unless he could rebut the buyer's allegations. Id. at
468-69.
'I' 272 F. Supp. 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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closely held but is now going public carries no per se warning sig-
nals. In DeMarco v. Edens,"2 the company made an agreement
with a reputable underwriter, complied with all the SEC filing re-
quirements, and went public. The underwriter, in serious financial
trouble, took the purchasers' money and never delivered their
stock. The purchasers' 12(2) complaint against the solvent com-
pany was unsuccessful,'" because the underwriter apparently was
reputable and nothing in the inquiries the company had made
ought to have triggered its suspicions. Another way of formulating
this consideration might be that the ordinary going-public sale of
stock is not so risky as to require especially high standards of care
concerning disclosure.
The SEC has insisted that brokers and dealers exercise in-
creased care when the security is a "hot issue," an unseasoned and
highly speculative venture.' In a disciplinary proceeding context,
the converse of this proposition also has been accepted: "[A]bsent
actual knowledge or warning signals, a broker-dealer should not be
under a duty to retain his own auditor to re-examine the books of
every company, the stock of which he may offer for sale, even ac-
cepting the doubtful hypothesis that such permission would be
granted.'135
2. Registered Issues. A range of care proportional to the
warnings sparked by the nature of the securities themselves is only
a rough description of the demands of section 12(2), however. A
refinement is suggested by the different roles the seller may play in
the distribution scheme. In a registered offering, the underwriter/
seller naturally has a greater burden of care than the broker/seller:
his section 11 duty to verify the registration statement overlaps
with his section 12(2) duty to be careful about the prospectus, be-
cause the prospectus is a part of the registration statement. 36 In
232 390 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1968).
133 The purchasers did win a judgment against the underwriter, which was not ap-
pealed. Id. at 838.
234 The Obligations of Underwriters, Brokers, and Dealers in Distributing and Trading
Securities, Particularly of New High Risk Ventures, SEC Sec. Act Rel. No. 5275 (July 26,
1972), reprinted in SEC Proposed Hot Issues Controls, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Special
Report No. 434 (July 26, 1972).
135 Levine v. SEC, 436 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1971) (disciplinary suspension of broker's
registration affirmed, because his intimacy with issuer put him on notice of mis-
representations).
11" See Form S-1, pt. 1, 1 DoNNZE=a SEC HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 3-2-3 to -32.
See also In re Gap Stores Sec. Litigation, 79 F.R.D. 283, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1978); text and note
at note 20 supra. The overlap is not quite complete, because the underwriter has a duty to
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this case, section 11 helps to define the duties of a particular kind
of seller. Because section 11 rests on a legislative judgment about
the underwriter's place in the scheme of distribution, that judg-
ment may carry over to other representations, beyond those of the
prospectus, that may be actionable under section 12(2) if not made
with sufficient care. The high expectations on the underwriter with
regard to the prospectus will color the degree of care it is reason-
able for him to take in making other representations to purchasers.
The broker, by contrast, does not occupy so high a place in the
scheme of distribution, and should not be required to exercise the
same degree of care.1 3 7
3. Unregistered Securities. Different problems arise when
the security is unregistered. Then there can be no spillover effect
from the duties imposed on a party by section 11 to the duties
imposed on that same party solely under section 12(2), as in the
case in which the underwriter's responsibility for the registration
statement and the prospectus gives additional credit to any further
representations he may make about the security. Nor can there be
any reliance on an official prospectus by a seller subject only to
section 12(2).
Section 12(1) covers securities that ought to have been regis-
tered but were not.""8 A seller who deals in such securities is
strictly liable. He has no defense based on his erroneous belief that
the securities were not required to be registered.13 9 This provision
both adds to the practical enforceability of section 5's registration
requirement and ensures that the purchaser will have as wide as
possible a choice of defendants. Between the section 11 defendants
and the section 12(1) seller, there is almost certain to be a solvent
verify the accuracy of the registration statement as of the date it becomes effective, but is
responsible under section 12(2) for the accuracy of the prospectus as of the date of sale. It
would be unreasonable to hold the underwriter to section l1's standard, in effect to require
a continuous process of investigation and verification of the official prospectus, during the
gap between the time the registration takes effect and the time of the sale. A less stringent
duty of care about changes in accuracy during the gap would be appropriate.
* Professor Loss assumes that reliance on the official prospectus by the seller who has
no other role in the distribution is reasonable. 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1708-09
(2d ed. 1961).
M' See text and note at note 27 supra.
139 This standard of liability illustrates how different civil liability and administrative
standards can be. In disciplinary proceedings the SEC suspends brokers' registrations when
they take insufficient care about the validity of exemptions claimed by the issuer-a negli-
gence rather than strict liability standard. See, e.g., Quinn v. SEC, 452 F.2d 943 (10th Cir.
1971); M.V. Gray Invs., Inc., 44 S.E.C. 567 (1971); Leonard Lazaroff, 43 S.E.C. 43 (1966);
Isthmus S.S. & Salvage Co., 42 S.E.C. 257 (1964).
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party.
Securities that are exempt from the registration require-
ments140 of section 5 are the harder case. Sellers are still liable for
negligent misstatements under section 12(2) in that case, but their
standard of care is particularly problematic because they have no
official information on which to rely. The SEC has argued that in
.such cases the protection of investors demands that the seller exer-
cise more than his usual care: "The mere fact that a security may
allegedly be exempt from the registration requirements . .. does
not relieve a dealer of [his] obligations. On the contrary, it may
increase his responsibilities, since neither he nor his customers re-
ceive the protection which registration under the Securities Act is
designed to provide."141 This argument is seriously flawed. Exemp-
tion from registration was not intended to relieve issuers and di-
rectors of burdens at the broker's expense. Rather, Congress chose
to exempt "certain types of securities and securities transactions
where there is no practical need for the Act's application or where
the public benefits are too remote. ' 142 Making the seller fulfill the
function that would have been served by registration defies the leg-
islative judgment that registration itself is unnecessary. Moreover,
the justifications for imposing heavy duties of verification on direc-
tors-that they have access to the information and stand to benefit
most by the sales-do not apply to mere sellers. At most the seller
should be required to exercise his usual reasonable care, and the
judgment of Congress that the exempted securities and transac-
tions are relatively safe indicates that less care than usual may be
reasonable.14
A recent case in the Seventh Circuit, Sanders v. John Nuveen
& Co. (Sanders IV), 44 presents the issue of what degree of care
is required of the seller who deals in exempt securities.1 45 The
140 See note 12 supra.
141 Distribution by Broker-Dealers of Unregistered Securities, SEC Sec. Act Rel. No.
4445 (Feb. 2, 1962), [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 76,820, at
81,068.
142 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933).
143 Even if increased care on the part of sellers would benefit investors, that would not
necessarily be a good reason to expand the seller's liability under the Act. It is important to
remember that the federal remedy does not supplant state common-law and statutory ones.
It is a special remedy with its own limitations and should not be expanded simply because a
general remedy would be more effective.
144 619 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3706 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981).
145 Whether the commercial paper Nuveen sold was in fact exempt was an issue in the
case. Section 3(a)(3) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(c)(a)(3) (1976), exempts from registra-
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plaintiffs in this case purchased from Nuveen the short-term com-
mercial paper of Winter & Hirsch, a consumer finance company.
Before marketing the notes Nuveen questioned the officers of Win-
ter & Hirsch, examined the audit reports prepared by an appar-
ently reputable accounting firm, and questioned Winter & Hirsch's
bank lenders. Unknown to the banks, Nuveen, or the purchasers,
Winter & Hirsch and its supposedly independent auditor had col-
lusively concealed the issuer's insolvency for more than ten years.
When the fraud came to light, Winter & Hirsch defaulted on the
notes purchased by the plaintiff, and left Nuveen as the only sol-
vent possible defendant. The court held Nuveen liable as an un-
derwriter under section 12(2) for failing to conduct a "reasonable
investigation" of the kind required of underwriters of registered
offerings under section 11.146 This decision presents several
tion "[a]ny note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a current
transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used for current transactions,
and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months." SEC Sec.
Act Rel. No. 4412, 26 Fed. Reg. 9158, 9159 (Sept. 20, 1961), reprinted in 17 C.F.R.
§ 231.4412 (1980), provides in addition, however, that to be eligible for the exemption the
notes must be of prime quality and eligible for rediscounting by Federal Reserve banks, and
of a type not usually sold to the general public. Relying on these requirements, the plaintiffs
in Sanders amended their complaint to add a claim under section 12(1), asserting that the
defendants had sold them unregistered nonexempt securities. The Sanders IV court de-
clined to decide this issue and assumed arguendo that the securities were exempt. 619 F.2d
at 1223-24 n.1.
Whether small-denomination notes purchased by noninstitutional investors should be
exempt from registration has been the subject of some controversy. See STAFF REPORT OF
THE SEC, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY (Subcomm. Print 1972);
Hicks, Commercial Paper: An Exempted Security Under Section 3(a)(3) of the Securities
Act of 1933, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 227 (1976); Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and
the Securities Acts, 39 U. CI. L. REV. 362 (1972).
148 Sanders began as a 10b-5 case in 1970. It first reached the Seventh Circuit on an
appeal from the district court's ruling that the Winter & Hirsch commercial paper qualified
as a security under the 1934 Act, and that ruling was affirmed. Sanders v. John Nuveen &
Co. (Sanders I), 463 F.2d 2075 (7th Cir. 1972). After denial of certiorari, 409 U.S. 1009
(1972), the case returned to the district court, and Nuveen was held liable under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act. This decision was affirmed in Sanders 11, 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.
1975). The Supreme Court vacated this decision and remanded the case, 425 U.S. 929
(1976), for reconsideration in light of its decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976). On reconsideration, the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that scienter had not
been shown, but remanded for rulings on the plaintiff's alternate section 12(2) claim. Sand-
ers III, 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977). The district court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to add a section 12(1) claim, and found Nuveen liable under both section 12(1)
and section 12(2). No. 70 C 597 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 1979). On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed with respect to section 12(2), adopting the reasoning of Sanders II, but did not
reach the section 12(1) claim. Sanders IV, 619 F.2d 1222, 1223 n.1, 1228 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3706 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981). Justice Powell dissented from the de-
nial of certiorari, in an opinion joined by Justice Rehnquist.
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problems.
First, had the securities been registered, Nuveen's section 11
duties as an underwriter arguably would have entitled purchasers
to expect a high degree of care when Nuveen performed other
functions covered only by section 12(2). Even in that case, how-
ever, the court's determination of what Nuveen should have done
is probably wrong. Demanding that Nuveen go behind the certified
audit reports and beyond its questioning of Winter & Hirsch's
bank lenders147 is even more rigorous than section 11 requires. Sec-
tion 11 parties, if they are not experts, are entitled to rely on the
statements of experts, 148 especially when the expert information
arouses no suspicion whatever. The court's assertion that reason-
able care required Nuveen to examine Winter & Hirsch's federal
income tax returns, corporate minutes, or accounting work
papers1 49 is explicable only as the product of hindsight.
Nuveen had no section 11 duties, however, if the securities
were not registrable.1 50 The court assumed that this distinction
made no difference, 51 treating the standard of care to which un-
derwriters should be held as a function of their status as under-
writers, rather than as a function of their role in the distribution of
registered securities. Like the SEC's argument about unregistered
securities, the court's argument about underwriters is flawed. The
statute itself defines underwriters very broadly as anyone who sells
securities on behalf of an issuer, directly or indirectly, and earns
more than the usual dealer's or broker's commissson.152 The notion
that an underwriter has a duty to investigate does not come from
the definition,153 but from section 11 itself. There the underwriter
147 619 F.2d at 1228 (adopting the reasoning of Sanders II, 524 F.2d at 1071).
148 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See text
and notes at notes 25, 39-54 supra. See also John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 49 U.S.L.W.
3706, 3707 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("the Court
of Appeals... seems to have imposed the higher duty prescribed by §11 to investigate, but
denied [Nuveen] the right to rely on 'the authority of an expert' that also is provided by
§11" (footnote omitted)).
149 Sanders II, 524 F.2d at 1069, approved in Sanders IV, 619 F.2d at 1228.
"5 See note 145 supra.
"' Indeed, it intimated that the lack of registration increased Nuveen's duty. Sanders
IV, 619 F.2d at 1228 n.13.
151 1933 Act § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1976), quoted in note 55 supra.
"I See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 671 (5th Cir. 1980). The duty to investigate could
perhaps be implied out of the compensation term; as suggested in text and notes at notes
119-122 supra, compensation might be one factor at which courts should look directly.
Nuveen's gross profit on the sales of Winter & Hirsch's commercial paper was 0.19%. Ap-
pellants' Reply Brief at 359 n.*, Sanders III, 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977).
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has a specific duty to investigate because he stands in a particular
position in the distributional hierarchy and because he often is in-
timately involved in, and able to act as a check on, the preparation
of the registration statement, which includes the prospectus. When
the security is not registered, the underwriter cannot perform that
distinctive function. Thus, in the context of unregistered securities,
drawing distinctions between the 12(2) underwriter and other
12(2) sellers does not make sense. The predicate for the distinc-
tion, that the underwriter is chargeable with special knowledge and
responsibilities, does not exist.
In holding Nuveen liable for failing to discover the conspiracy
between the issuer and its auditor, the court seems to have been
motivated by a conviction that the injured purchasers should have
a judgment against a solvent defendant. It is important to remem-
ber, however, that neither the 1933 Act in particular nor all the
securities legislation in the aggregate was designed to provide in-
vestors with insurance. One of the risks they still take is the risk
that those the laws make liable for fraud will be unable to compen-
sate for the harm they cause.1
CONCLUSION
The Securities Act of 1933 created an intricate scheme of re-
sponsibilities. Because of recent restrictions in the use of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the explicit remedies
of the 1933 Act contained in sections 11 and 12 are likely to be
used much more frequently in the future, making resolution of
their ambiguities important. Section 12(2) in particular presents
difficult problems of interpretation. The legislative history of the
1933 Act strongly suggests that the specific and generally high
duty of care required by section 11 ought not to be read into sec-
tion 12(2). Apart from that caveat, section 12(2) can be given defi-
nition and a measure of predictability in its operation if courts will
consider certain enumerated factors rather than vague policy aims.
These include the nature of the buyer-seller relationship in
I" See John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, 49 U.S.L.W. 3706, 3707 n.4 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981)
(Powell, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari): "For the most part, certified public ac-
countants faithfully have fulfilled the trust placed on them. But where breaches by account-
ants occur, it is the accountants themselves-not those who rely in good faith on their pro-
fessional expertise-who are at fault and who should be held responsible."
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general, any indications that the buyer-seller relationship has been
deliberately and consensually altered, and the nature of the secur-
ity sold.
Catherine Masters Epstein
